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Abstract We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new
potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to
bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the
actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that
there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.
Keywords Rent-seeking contest · Entry · Bribing
JEL Classification D7
1 Introduction
Tullock (1980) introduced the rent-seeking contest where a number of risk-neutral players
compete for a single indivisible prize. Each player can increase his probability of winning
the prize by exerting a nonrefundable effort. A well-known application of the model is that
the players, say firms, lobby for a monopoly rent which is awarded by the contest organizer,
say the government. The model has spawned a large literature, see Nitzan (1994), Lockard
and Tullock (2001), Konrad (2007) and Congleton et al. (2008). Matros (2006) carefully
examined the effects of the addition (or deletion) of one extra player on both the individual
and aggregate efforts and the winning probabilities in equilibrium. He has not analyzed the
effects on equilibrium payoffs.1
This paper also examines the effects of adding a new player to a rent-seeking contest.
However, in contrast to Matros (2006), we suppose that the new player might be bribed to
1Higgins et al. (1985) investigated the equilibrium number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking efforts
in a situation with free entry in both Tullock’s (1980) contest and a more general contest. However, bribing
does not play a role in their analysis.
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commit not to enter the contest. We have a two-stage model. In stage 1, each incumbent
player (who participates in the contest anyway) noncooperatively decides how much to con-
tribute to bribe the new player. If the summation of all contributions is at least as large as
the reservation payoff of the new player, this player will be bribed, retain all offers and exit.
Otherwise, the contributions are refunded to the incumbents, and the new player will enter.
In stage 2, we have the actual contest either with or without the new player, depending on
what has happened in stage 1. We present conditions such that the model has (pure-strategy
subgame-perfect) equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.
Stage 1 of our model is related to private voluntary contribution games for public goods as
analyzed by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Cadsby and Maynes (1999). The reason is that
each incumbent, even if he has contributed nothing to bribe the new player, will benefit if the
latter stays away. This gives each incumbent an incentive to free ride on the contributions of
others. Our work is further related to recent papers on corruption and collusion in auctions.
See Eso˝ and Schummer (2004), who study a second-price auction where one player can bribe
the other player to commit not to participate in the auction (see further Chen and Tauman
2006). Note that we have a peculiar form of collusion, wherein the primary beneficiaries
may not be one of the colluders, but the non-bribing players.
In Sect. 2 we outline the model and investigate its equilibria. We conclude in Sect. 3.
Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model and results
Consider a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest for a prize in the following two-stage
model. There are n incumbent players (n ≥ 2) who will compete in the contest regardless.
There is a (potential) entrant, player n + 1, who contemplates participating in the contest.
All players are risk neutral. The observable valuation of the prize by player i = 1, . . . , n+ 1
is vi > 0. Without loss of generality we assume that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn > 0 and that the unit





= 1. The latter implies that vi > 1 for i = 1, . . . , n. Notice
that both vn+1 ≤ vn and vn+1 > vn are possible. In stage 1, each incumbent decides how
much to contribute to bribe player n + 1 to stay away. Suppose that incumbent i contributes
some fraction zi ≥ 0 of the reservation payoff of player n+1, where this payoff is defined as
the equilibrium payoff player n+ 1 will obtain in case he enters the contest. If ∑nj=1 zj ≥ 1,
player n + 1 is being bribed, i.e., he retains all contributions and exits (he may keep excess
contributions). If ∑nj=1 zj < 1, player n + 1 will not be bribed and enters the contest, while
the contributions are refunded to the incumbents without further costs. In stage 2, we have
the actual contest for the prize among the n incumbents if player n + 1 has been bribed.
Otherwise, the contest is among all n + 1 players. We assume that in stage 1 the organizer
of the contest observes neither the players nor the possible bribing of the entrant; however
he observes all active players in stage 2. We find equilibria of this model applying backward
induction.
Consider stage 2 if the entrant has been bribed. The probability that player i = 1, . . . , n
wins the prize is pi,n = xi,n/∑nj=1 xj,n, with xj,n ≥ 0 the nonrefundable effort of player j .
The second subindex ‘n’ attached to a variable indicates that we consider the contest with
n players. If all players expend zero effort, each player wins the prize with probability 1/n.
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Using Stein (2002), we know that in the (unique) equilibrium player i exerts effort xˆi,n =





= n− 1 (throughout we denote equilibrium values
with a hat). Hence, his equilibrium payoff is πˆi,n = 1vi (vi − sn)2 = 1vi (vi − n + 1)2. So far,
we have assumed that all n players are active in equilibrium, i.e., exert a positive effort.
Using Stein (2002), this is true if and only if the smallest valuation is ‘large enough’, i.e.,
vn > (n − 2)/∑n−1j=1 1vj , or equivalently vn > n − 1.
Next, consider stage 2 if the entrant has not been bribed. Player i = 1, . . . , n + 1 max-
imizes πi,n+1, where the subindex ‘n + 1’ means that we have the contest with n + 1
players. The equilibrium effort and payoff of player i are xˆi,n+1 = sn+1(1 − sn+1vi ) and





. If vn+1 ≤ vn, all players are active in
equilibrium if and only if vn+1 > (n − 1)/∑nj=1 1vj = n − 1. If vn+1 > vn, all players are
active in equilibrium if and only if vn > (n − 1)/(∑n−1j=1 1vj + 1vn+1 ).
We present Assumption 1 and Lemma 1.
Assumption 1 All players are active in the equilibrium in stage 2 of both the contest with
n players and n + 1 players.
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 is equivalent to stating that one of the following three situations
holds: (1) n − 1 < vn+1 ≤ vn; (2) v1 = vn and vn < vn+1; (3) v1 > vn and n − 1 < vn <
vn+1 < vnn−vn .
We will impose Assumption 1 from now on. Notice that if player n + 1 would not be
active in the contest with n+ 1 players, his appearance would have no consequences, which
is not interesting.2
Proceeding, examine i ≡ πˆi,n − πˆi,n+1 for i = 1, . . . , n, i.e., the difference for incum-
bent i between the payoff in the equilibrium of stage 2 with respectively n and n+1 players.
We have i = 1vi (vi − sn)2 − 1vi (vi − sn+1)2 =
s2n−s2n+1
vi
+2(sn+1 − sn). We know from Matros
(2006) that vi > sn+1 > sn > 0 for each i. Hence, 1 ≥ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ n > 0. Notice that entry
of player n + 1 hurts all incumbents.
Next, we turn to stage 1 where each incumbent decides how much to contribute to
bribe player n + 1. Recall that player n + 1 will be bribed if ∑nj=1 zj ≥ 1. Hence, incum-
bent i selects zi while facing payoff function πˆi,n − ziπˆn+1,n+1 if ∑nj=1 zj ≥ 1, and πˆi,n+1
if
∑n
j=1 zj < 1. Define z−i =
∑
j =i zj . Obviously, incumbent i will never select zi > 1. If
z−i ≥ 1, the best response of incumbent i equals zi = 0. If 0 ≤ z−i < 1, the contribution
zi = 1 − z−i is (just) enough to bribe player n + 1. This is optimal for incumbent i if and
only if i ≥ (1 − z−i )πˆn+1,n+1. Proposition 1 characterizes the best response of incumbent i
if 0 ≤ z−i < 1.
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider incumbent i = 1, . . . , n. Let 0 ≤ z−i < 1 be
given. In stage 1, zi = 1−z−i is the best response of incumbent i if both (i) vn+1 < f (1−z−i )
2One might also consider the case where in the n−player contest some incumbents remain inactive in equi-
librium. However, such incumbents will never bribe the new player, which makes this case less interesting.
Next, it might also happen that in the (n + 1)-player contest, some incumbents become inactive in equilib-
rium. Analysis of bribing along the lines of Proposition 1 becomes analytically cumbersome in this case and
does not yield new insights.
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and (ii) vi ≥ g(1 − z−i , vn+1) hold. Else any zi ∈ [0,1 − z−i ) is a best response. Here, with
0 < z ≤ 1, we have:
f (z) = (n − 1)z + 2 +
√
((n − 1)z + 2)2 + 8z
2z
,
g(z, vn+1) = (2n − 1)vn+1 + n − 1
((n − 1)z + 2)vn+1 + 2 − zv2n+1
.
Thus, given 0 ≤ z−i < 1, incumbent i makes a contribution which is sufficient to bribe
player n + 1 if and only if vn+1 is ‘small enough’, and moreover vi is ‘large enough’. The
threshold for vn+1 depends only on z−i and n; the threshold for vi depends on z−i , vn+1
and n. It can be verified that f (z) is decreasing in z, while g(z, vn+1) is increasing in both
z and vn+1. These effects correspond to intuition. If z−i increases, conditions (i) and (ii) of
Proposition 1 are relaxed. If vn+1 increases, condition (ii) becomes tighter.
Observe that equilibria with bribing are characterized by the following two conditions:
(a) ∑nj=1 zˆj = 1, and (b) i ≥ zˆi πˆn+1,n+1 for i = 1, . . . , n. Clearly, if
∑n
j=1 j > πˆn+1,n+1,
there exist many of these equilibria. However, besides these, there may also exist multiple
equilibria without bribing. Suppose, e.g., that 1 < πˆn+1,n+1. We then have such equilibria
if
∑n
j=1 zˆj < 1 and
∑
j =i zˆj πˆn+1,n+1 + i < πˆn+1,n+1 for i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that these
(inefficient) equilibria without bribing are caused by free-riding behavior of the incumbents,
cf. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989).
Using Proposition 1 we can easily find necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex-
istence of specific equilibria with bribing. We focus on three interesting examples. First,
we have an equilibrium with bribing in which each incumbent makes a contribution pro-
portional to his own valuation (i.e., zˆi = vi∑
j vj
for all i) if and only if vn+1 < f ( v1∑
j vj
) and
vi ≥ g( vi∑
j vj
, vn+1) for i = 1, . . . , n.3 Second, there is an equilibrium with bribing where the
contribution is identical for each incumbent (i.e., zˆi = 1n for all i) if and only if vn+1 < f ( 1n )
and vn ≥ g( 1n , vn+1). If v1 = · · · = vn = vn+1, such an equilibrium exists for all n ≥ 2.4
Third, there exists an equilibrium where a single incumbent i bribes player n + 1 (i.e.,
zˆi = 1 and zˆj = 0 for j = i) if and only if vn+1 < f (1) and vi ≥ g(1, vn+1). Interestingly, if
v1 = · · · = vn = vn+1, such an equilibrium only exists for n = 2.
Matros (2006) has shown that the aggregate equilibrium efforts always strictly increase
if an additional active player enters the contest. Thus, bribing hurts the organizer of the
contest if he is interested in maximizing aggregate efforts. Recall however that in our model
the organizer cannot observe possible bribing in stage 1.
3 Conclusion
We have analyzed a two-stage rent-seeking contest where a new player might be bribed to
stay away. We have presented conditions such that bribing occurs in equilibrium. However,
due to free-riding behavior, we may also have equilibria without bribing. For simplicity, we
assumed that the incumbents have all the bargaining power, i.e., the new player accepts the
3Notice that we have f ( v1∑
j vj
) ≤ f ( v2∑
j vj





j=1 1vj = 1, that vi = n for i = 1, . . . , n + 1 in this case.
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bribing contributions in case he receives at least his (minimum) reservation payoff. However,
qualitatively the results do not depend on this assumption. Finally, note that bribery will be
hard to observe for a researcher, since players will hide such behavior. Yet, our results show
that it can prevail in equilibrium.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 We distinguish two cases: (i) vn+1 ≤ vn, and (ii) vn+1 > vn. In case (i) we
directly obtain that all relevant players are active in both contests if and only if vn+1 > n−1.




= 1, we have vn = n in subcase (iia), and thus all relevant players are always active
in both contests. In subcase (iib) we have vn < n. Using this, we obtain that all players
are active in the contest with n + 1 players if and only if vn > (n − 1)/(1 − 1vn + 1vn+1 ) or
vn+1 < vnn−vn . The lemma follows directly. 








n − 1 + nvn+1
vn+1 + 1 − 2vi
)(










(2vi − n + 1 + (2vi + 1 − 2n)vn+1)(vn+1 − n + 1) ≥ (vn+1 − n + 1)2zvivn+1. (A.1)
Using Assumption 1, we always have vn+1 − n + 1 > 0. As a result, (A.1) can be simpli-
fied to vi[(2 + nz − z)vn+1 + 2 − zv2n+1] ≥ (2n − 1)vn+1 + n − 1. Notice that vi > 0 and
(2n − 1)vn+1 + n − 1 > 0 since n ≥ 2. Hence, we must have h(vn+1) ≡ (2 + nz − z)vn+1 +
2− zv2n+1 > 0 as well. Note that h(n−1) = 2n > 0. The unique positive root of h(vn+1) = 0
equals vn+1 = (n−1)z+2+
√
((n−1)z+2)2+8z
2z (> n − 1). Thus, h(vn+1) > 0 for vn+1 > 0 if and
only if vn+1 ∈ (n − 1, (n−1)z+2+
√
((n−1)z+2)2+8z
2z ). The proposition follows easily. 
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